Abstract-The problem of publishing privacy-guaranteed data for hypothesis testing is studied using the maximal leakage (ML) as a metric for privacy and the type-II error exponent as the utility metric. The optimal mechanism (random mapping) that maximizes utility for a bounded leakage guarantee is determined for the entire leakage range for binary datasets. For non-binary datasets, approximations in the high privacy and high utility regimes are developed. The results show that, for any desired leakage level, maximizing utility forces the ML privacy mechanism to reveal partial to complete knowledge about a subset of the source alphabet. The results developed on maximizing a convex function over a polytope may also of an independent interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is tremendous value to publishing datasets for a variety of statistical inference applications; however, it is crucial to ensure that the published dataset while providing utility does not reveal other information. Specifically, the published dataset should allow the intended inference to be made while limiting other inferences. This requires using a randomizing mechanism (i.e., a noisy channel) that guarantees a certain measure of privacy; however, any such privacy mechanism will, in turn, reduce the fidelity of the intended inference leading to a tradeoff between utility of the published data and the privacy of the respondents in the dataset.
Recently, in [1] , Issa et al. (see also [2] ) propose the metric of maximal leakage (ML) as a measure of the gain, in bits, in guessing any function of the original data from the published data and show that it is effectively the Sibson mutual information of order ∞ of the randomized mapping (the privacy mechanism) from the alphabet of the original to that of the published dataset. Inspired by the operational significance of the ML metric, for the statistical application of binary hypothesis testing, we determine the privacy-utility tradeoff (PUT) using ML as the privacy metric and the type-II error exponent as the utility metric. We consider the local privacy model in which the same (memoryless) mechanism is applied independently to each entry of the dataset. This captures a large class of applications in which the respondents of a dataset can apply a privacy mechanism before sharing data. We present closed-form expressions for the PUT for This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. CCF-1350914 and CIF-1422358. binary sources for any leakage level; for arbitrary source alphabets we obtain the PUT in the high and low privacy regimes.
Our results show that the maximal leakage mechanism in trying to simultaneously ensure utility and restrict leakage yields output symbols that reveal either complete or partial knowledge about a subset of the source symbols. Specifically for the binary case, the mechanism is such that the published data reveals the original data for one of the source letters without any uncertainty! This behavior results from a combination of the maximal leakage requirement (feasible polytope) and the convexity of the relative entropy as a function of the privacy mechanism (randomized mapping). Due to space limitations, we do not include all proofs. We refer the readers to [3] for proof details.
Notation: We use bold capital letters to represent matrices, e.g. X is a matrix whose i th column is X i and (i, j) th entry is X ij . We use bold lower case letters to represent row vectors, e.g. x is a vector with the i th entry x i . We denote sets by capital calligraphic letters, e.g., X . For a vector x with entries x i , [x] is a diagonal matrix whose the i th diagonal entry is x i . We use · and log(·) to denote the 2 norm and logarithm with base 2, respectively; D denotes the relative entropy. The phase "column permutation" implies the application of a permutation operation on the columns of a matrix.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Binary hypothesis testing is a statistical inference problem concerning the decision between two distinct probability distributions of the observed data. Let X n = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ) denote a sequence of n random variables, whose entries X i ∈ X, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a distribution p that is hypothesized to be either
be the probabilities of error, such that type-I error β
2 ) is the probability of choosing H 2 (resp. H 1 ) when original data x n is generated by p 1 (resp. p 2 For random variables X andX as well as the privacy mechanism W defined above, the following proposition summarizes the definition and simplification of the maximal leakage in [1, Def. 1, Thm. 1, Cor. 1].
The expression in (1) is equivalent to 
The detailed proof can be found in [3, App. A].
A. Privacy-Utility Trade-off
The PUT for the binary hypothesis testing problem with maximal leakage and relative entropy as privacy and utility measures, respectively, is given by the following non-convex optimization
where
By adding M slack variables j , j ∈ {1, . . . , M}, the privacy constraint in (3a) can be rewritten as
From (4) and (5) in conjunction with (3b) and (3c), we note that the feasible region of (3) is a M 2 + M dimensional polytope resulting from 2M 2 + M + 1 linear constraints. The optimization problem is non-convex since it involves maximizing a convex function. Furthermore, since the feasible region is a polytope, the optimal solutions are on the boundary. Specifically, at least one corner point of the polytope is an optimal solution of (3). However, enumerating the vertices of the polytope is infeasible. As a first step to obtaining closed-form solutions, in the following theorem, we highlight properties of the optimal solutions. 
For the maximal leakage l = 1 + max{a, b, c} − min{a, b, c}, where a, b, c ∈ (0, 1), if W 1 is an optimal solution of (3), then so is W 2 , and so are all convex combinations of W 1 and W 2 , since they preserve the objective.
In the following section, we obtain a closed-form expression for the PUT in (3) for binary sources. 
and is achieved by
Due to space restrictions, we briefly outline the proof (see [3, App. C] for details). Let ρ 1 and ρ 2 be the off-diagonal entries of the privacy mechanism W. The constraint in (3a) simplifies to
and along with these in (3b) and (3c) yields the shaded region in the (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) space as shown in Fig. 1 . The vertices 1 and 4 result from column permutations of W, and thus, have the same utility. Similarly, vertices 2 and 3 have the same utility. On the other hand, vertices 5 and 6 achieve zero utility. Therefore, it suffices to compare the utilities at vertices 1 and 2 given by f 1 in (6) and f 2 in (7), respectively. From (9), we note that for all l and both cases (f 1 ≥ f 2 or f 1 ≤ f 2 ), there is no uncertainty of the input symbol given one of the output symbols. This is a direct consequence of the convexity of the relative entropy and the linearity of the ML constraint. These observations, coupled with fact that 2 l ≥ 1 for the binary case, forces one of the ρ i to be 1 (or 0).
IV. TRADE-OFF FOR ARBITRARY ALPHABETS
In this section, we consider non-binary sources, i.e., M > 2. Because it is challenging to find closed-form solutions, we focus on two extremal regimes: namely, the high privacy (l ≈ 0) low utility and low privacy (l ≈ log M ) high utility regimes. In each regime, we exploit the continuous differentiability of D in W to approximate the relative entropy objective about the extremal points (presented in Lemma 1). This allows us to simplify the optimization problem and subsequently obtain closed-form solutions.
A. Euclidean Approximation in High Privacy regime
From Lemma 1, recall that for the perfect privacy case, i.e., l = 0, the optimal mechanism W 0 is a rank-1 row stochastic matrix. In particular, all rows of W 0 are the same vector w 0 . Thus the two output distributions are the same, i.e., p k W 0 = w 0 for all k = 1, 2. In the high privacy regime, we introduce an Euclidean information theoretic (EIT) approximation (see also [5] , [6] ) of D(p 1 W p 2 W) by restricting its Taylor series about W = W 0 to the second (quadratic) term
2 (see also [7] ). The mechanism W is assumed to be in a small neighborhood about W 0 , such that for some small δ ∈ [0,
This, in turn, implies that l ≤ log(1+Mδ). Therefore, for l ∈ [0, 1], the EIT approximation of the utility function D(p 1 W p 2 W) results in the following optimization
Since the feasible regions in (11) and (3) are the same, the optimal solutions of the EIT approximation in (11) are also feasible for the original PUT in (3), thus the utility of the optimal solutions of (11) is a lower bound of the optimal utility of (3), and the EIT approximation is tight for l very close to 0, i.e., δ ≈ 0.
Observe that in (11), the objective depends on p 1 − p 2 and being a convex function, is maximized on the boundary 2017 
of the EIT approximation in (11) for l ≤ 1.
Theorem 3. For non-binary sources in the high privacy regime, i.e., l ∈ [0, 1], the maximal utility of the EIT approximation (11) is
The optimal mechanism W * has two unique columns: one of the two columns has nonzero entries given by 2 The proof of Theorem 3 is in Appendix A. The proof hinges on the following two simplifications:
(i) Since p 1 −p 2 contains both positive and negative entries, maximizing (p 1 − p 2 )W requires that every column of the optimal solution W * has either the maximal and minimal values of the column in the positions indexed by I + and I − , respectively, or vice versa. This allows finding the structure of W * . (ii) We further exploit the EIT approximation that all rows of the optimal mechanism W * are in a small neighborhood centered at w 0 to find the optimal w 0 . This relies on (i) above in exploiting the structure of W * .
Thus, Theorem 3 shows that to preserve the utility of binary hypothesis testing while matching the maximal leakage, the privacy mechanism first splits all input symbols into two subsets S 1 and S 2 = X \ S 1 . Specifically, every symbol in S 1 has a higher probability under H 1 than under H 2 , i.e., the indices of symbols in S 1 (resp. S 2 ) are in J + (resp. J − ). The privacy mechanism then maps all symbols of S 1 with the same probability to a single output. Similarly, all symbols in S 2 are mapped with the same probability to a single output that is distinct from that of S 1 . Therefore, observing one of these two output symbols, we know the corresponding input subset even if we cannot identify the exact input symbols within the subset.
Remark 2. From Theorem 3, we have that if either I + or I −
has only one element, the privacy mechanism W * of the EIT approximation will reveal one input symbol as is.
B. Linear Approximation in High Utility Regime
From Lemma (1), recall that for the perfect utility, i.e., l = log M , all column permutations of the identity matrix are optimal. Without loss of generality, we choose the identity matrix, i.e., W = I, as the perfect utility achieving mechanism. In the high utility regime, i.e., l ≥ log(M − 1), by expanding the Taylor series around the identity matrix, we can approximate the objective to the first order as
, where the expression Tr(ΨW T ) represents the trace of the matrix ΨW T and Ψ is the partial derivative matrix of D(p 1 W p 2 W) calculated at the identity matrix, and has entries equal to
The resulting PUT in the high utility regime is
where l ≥ log(M − 1). The optimization in (14) is a linear program and can be efficiently solved. The following lemma presents a property of the optimal solutions of (14).
Lemma 2. For the high utility regime, i.e., l ≥ log(M − 1), the optimal solution W * of (14) has no less than M (M − 2) zero entries such that all diagonal entries are positive and every input symbol is mapped to at most two output symbols.
The proof of Lemma 2 is in [3, App. E]. Basically, the proof follows from the fact that the maximal entry in each row of Ψ in (13) is on the diagonal and that the objective in (14) is the sum of convex combinations of every row of Ψ. Thus, in the high utility regime, at least one revealed symbol reduces uncertainty about the input to at most one bit!
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have developed the PUTs for the hypothesis testing problem using ML as the privacy metric and the error exponent as the utility metric. Our results for both binary and M -ary data suggest that the mechanism guaranteeing a bounded ML, i.e., limiting guesses about arbitrary functions of X n , is able to maximize the utility only by partially or fully revealing a few input symbols (even in the high privacy regime). This raises concern about the appropriateness of ML for this problem. In contrast, in the high privacy regime, the mutual information privacy metric [7] 
We now show that the optimal solution W * of (11) has at most two columns for which W * j,max − W * j,min > 0. For l > 0, i.e., 2 l > 1, since W * achieves the maximal leakage of l bits and is row stochastic, the maximal values of the columns of W * are not all in the same row. Thus, W * has at least two columns, one in the form of (16) and the other in the form of (17). The remaining columns of W * are either in the form of (16) or of (17). Let J 1 = j : W * ij is in the form of (16)} and J 2 = j : W * ij is in the form of (17 
